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ABSTRACT Woods and Hudak take analogical arguments to be meta-arguments, or arguments about arguments.  I 
argue that their emphasis on "deep structure" or "logical form" does not allow for a proper understanding of 
analogical argumentation that takes place in the absence of a complete grasp of the deep structure of the first order 
arguments in analogical meta-arguments. 
Introduction: Analogical Arguments as Meta-Arguments 
Woods and Hudak (1989, 127) take analogical arguments to be meta-arguments, or 
arguments about arguments; they offer the following general schematic for how such arguments 
are to be reconstructed. 
1. Argument A possess a deep structure whose logical form provides that the premisses of A 
bear relation R to its conclusion. 
2. Argument B shares with A the same deep structure. 
3. Therefore, B possesses a deep structure whose logical form provides that its premisses 
likewise bear R to its conclusion. 
4. Hence, B is an analogue of A.  A and B are good or bad arguments, by parity of reasoning, 
so-called. 
Call this Meta-Schema I.  There are at least two ways to interpret this schema.  First, we may 
understand the argument from (1), (2), and (3) to (4) as being monotonic.  Call this the Strong 
Interpretation.  Second, we may understand this same meta-argument as being non-monotonic.  
In other words, if (1) through (3) are true, then (4) follows, but when further claims are added to 
the premise set, (4) may not follow.  Call this the Weak Interpretation.  As we will see in the next 
section, W&H are committed to the Strong Interpretation.   
I will argue that the W&H approach to reconstructing analogical argument is committed to 
the following claim: 
 (I) that R (refereed to in the schema) can in principle (after reflection) be completely stated 
by those wanting to engage in the evaluation of analogical arguments.    
I will argue that at least with respect to some reconstructions of analogical arguments, (I) is 
false.  This is a concern for the W&H analysis of analogical argument since it undermines the 
idea that logical form and consistency play a central role in reconstructing and evaluating such 
arguments.  
On Consistency and Logical Form 
Woods and Hudak (1989, 126 & 137 n7) want to reconstruct analogical arguments in such a 
way that those who refuse to treat arguments having the same deep structure as both good or bad 
are guilty of an inconsistency.  To see this point, let us consider how they treat Judith Thomson's 
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celebrated abortion-kidnapped-violinist analogy.  Thomson asks us to consider the case of a 
violinist who is dying of a kidney ailment.  The society of music lovers kidnaps you, knocks you 
out, and hooks you up to the violinist so that your kidneys are filtering his blood.  You awake, 
and the doctor apologises and says that he had nothing to do with this.  Furthermore, you are 
informed that you may unplug yourself from the violinist and walk away.  Doing so will lead to 
the violinist's death, and the only way to keep the violinist alive is if you stay hooked up to the 
violinist for an indeterminate period of time, perhaps nine months, perhaps longer.  Thomson 
suggests that while it would be decent of you to stay hooked up to the violinist, you are not 
morally required to do so.  She also suggests that by analogy, a woman is not required to see a 
pregnancy through (or stay "hooked up" to the fetus) if the pregnancy was the result of rape.  
Clearly, there are similarities between the case of a pregnancy resulting from rape and a case of 
being forcibly hooked up to the violinist.  However, for Woods and Hudak (1989, 126), it is not 
helpful to simply assert that from "the fact that things are similar in certain respects that they are 
also similar in certain other respects" because this "leaves it unexplained as to how the 
similarities interact with the inconsistency" associated with "resisting the conclusion." 
According to Woods and Hudak (W&H), the Violinist-Abortion argument is a meta-
argument.  The idea is that there are two target arguments at issue, and that they are either both 
good or both bad in virtue of sharing a deep structure or logical form.  W&H (1989, 129) offer 
the following as an attempt to capture the logical form at issue: 
(1) without H2's consent, H1 has placed H2 in a state of vital dependency; 
(2) the period of dependency is indeterminate (perhaps nine months, perhaps nine years, 
perhaps forever); 
(3) the dependency is a grievous impediment both to locomotion and to (stationary) 
mobility; 
(4) the dependency constitutes a grievous invasion of privacy; 
(5) it is an invitation to social disaster, for H2 (and H1 as well) is a laughing stock; 
(6) it threatens H2's economic self-sufficiency… 
(7) therefore, it would be morally permissible for H2 to terminate the vital dependency. 
Call this Target Schema I.  The idea is that the above form applies both to the violinist 
argument and to the abortion argument.  If the two arguments are analogues of one another, then 
they are analogues in virtue of sharing a logical form.  The analogical argument is a meta-
argument that says the two arguments are either both good or both bad in virtue of sharing the 
same form.  If we look at Meta-Schema I (offered at the beginning of this paper) then we can say 
that the logical form just examined is R; the violinist argument (henceforth referred to as 
Violinist) is A, and the argument for abortion in cases of rape-induced pregnancy (henceforth 
cited as Abortion) is B.  What W&H suggest is that if the first three statements Meta-Schema I 
are true, then the fourth must be true.  To assert the premises and deny the conclusion is to be 
guilty of an inconsistency.  The notion of logical form or deep structure is intended to do the 
work of capturing the similarity between arguments in such a way as to license the charge of 
inconsistency if the two target arguments (A and B) are treated differently. 
To clarify the above further, consider how William H. Shaw and L.R. Ashley (1983, 420) 
reconstruct analogical arguments: 
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1. Objects O1, O2, O3, . . . On have Properties P2, P3, P4, . . ., Pk in common. 
2. Objects O2, O3, . . ., On have Property P1 in common.  Therefore, it is probable that  
3. Object O1 has Property P1. 
There may be a tension in asserting 1 and 2 but denying 3, but there is no inconsistency, at 
least not in the logician's sense of that term.  W&H (1989, 137) express concern that such a 
reconstruction of analogical argument is inadequate since it renders us unable to charge someone 
with an inconsistency if they accept 1 and 2 but deny 3.  The whole point of stressing that the 
similarity between the alleged analogues is to be cashed in terms of sameness of deep structure 
or logical form is to make it possible to lay the charge of being inconsistent if the premisses of 
the meta-argument (claims 1 through 3 of Meta-Schema I) are asserted but the conclusion (claim 
4) is denied. 
A Critique of the Role of Logical Form 
The concern discussed in this section goes to the heart of the W&H reconstruction of 
analogical argument.  While W&H (1989, 129) point out that a complete articulation of an 
analogical meta-argument (and of the logical form of the first order arguments the meta-
argument is concerned with) is often not required for eventual analogical settlement of the 
dispute, they claim that "nothing in principle prevents a disputant from giving a complete 
articulation of his side of the issue . . . ". The purpose of this section of the paper is to suggest 
that a complete articulation of the logical form of the target arguments of an analogical meta-
argument is sometimes not possible; this suggests that even a single disputant may not be able to 
give a complete articulation of his side of the issue.  If the preceding is correct, then analogical 
arguments and the judgements of similarity they require can carry on in the absence of the 
existence of a completely specifiable logical form for the target arguments. 
W&H argue that the notion of logical form is required to cash out what it means for the 
target arguments to be similar, and the logical form conception of similarity is used to underwrite 
the charge that one is inconsistent if one accepts the premisses of an analogical meta-argument 
but denies the conclusion.  I will suggest that there are times when it may not be possible to 
understand similarity in terms of logical form, at least not if the notion of logical form is the sort 
that can license a charge of inconsistency.  Moreover, I will suggest that being able to make the 
charge of inconsistency is not essential to being able to evaluate all analogical arguments. 
W&H (1989, 138) offer an example of an argument which attempts to cast doubt on the 
validity of the logical form at issue in Thomson's violinist-abortion analogy; the argument is 
about two Siamese twins, referred to as a and b. 
1. Their attachment is such as to constitute for a vital dependency upon b, but not vice-
versa. 
2. The attachment is such as to constitute a sever impediment to locomotion and mobility. 
3. The dependency is temporally indeterminate, for though a could die at any time, it is 
possible that he will have a full life-span. 
4. Honourable employment is all but out of the question. 
5. a and b are subject to morbid and demeaning curiosity. 
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6. Their attachment is a perpetual and reciprocal invasion of privacy. 
7. Both are innocent victims of circumstance. 
Would b be morally justified in severing the attachment? 
Call this argument Siamese. W&H are intimating (and rightly so to my way of thinking) that 
it would be inappropriate for b to sever the attachment and let a die.  Siamese instantiates 
essentially the same logical form as Violinist and Abortion.  The suggestion is that they should 
all stand or fall together. 
There is a way to counter the preceding suggestion.  We might say that there are important 
differences between Siamese, Violinist, and Abortion.  First, the social consequences of requiring 
the Siamese twins to stay connected are different from the social consequences of either 
requiring people to stay hooked up to patients or requiring women to see pregnancy through if 
they have been raped.  If might turn into open season on anyone who has a blood type that could 
be useful to others in the way that the kidnapped victim had a blood type that allowed her to 
filter the violinist's blood.  Moreover, it could be open season on women who do not want (more) 
children but who have partners who do want (more) children.  Requiring that the vital 
dependency remain intact in the Siamese case does not have the same sort of frightful 
consequences.  Second, we could point out that while things are difficult for the Siamese twins, 
they have had the opportunity to get used to one another since birth.  The psychological 
consequences of keeping them attached are different from the psychological consequences of 
putting people in a state of vital dependency when they have lived their whole lives not being in 
such a state. 
The ways in which Siamese differs from Violinist and Abortion may suggest to some that we 
have to reconceive the logical form at work in the Violinist-Abortion analogical argument.  
Perhaps the form is as follows. 
Target Schema II 
(P1)  without H2's consent, H1 has placed H2 in a state of vital dependency; 
(P2)  the period of dependency is indeterminate (perhaps nine months, perhaps nine years, 
perhaps forever); 
(P3)  the dependency is a grievous impediment both to locomotion and to (stationary) mobility; 
(P4)  the dependency constitutes a grievous invasion of privacy; 
(P5)  it is an invitation to social disaster, for H2 (and H1 as well) is a laughing stock; 
(P6)  it threatens H2's economic self-sufficiency; 
(P7)  there are grave social consequences if H2 is required  to remain in remain in a state of 
vital dependency1; 
                                                 
1Some might wonder what the difference is between P5 and P7.  It is just this: the "social disaster" referred to 
in P5 refers to the negative social consequences for H1 and H2.  The "grave social consequences" (which some might 
say is another way of talking about a social disaster) refers to the negative social consequences for people other than 
H1 and H2. 
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(P8)  H2 would have a very difficult time adjusting to being placed in a state of vital 
dependency since H2 has no experience living this way. 
(C)      therefore, it would be morally permissible for H2 to terminate the vital dependency. 
The first six conditions restate the form identified by W&H; conditions (P7) and (P8) are 
new.  It might be tempting to say that Target Schema II really does capture why Violinist and 
Abortion are similar while differentiating them from Siamese.  However tempting this move 
might be, it should be resisted.  Consider a modified version of the violinist case, where the 
masses believe the violinist to be guilty of murder, but in fact, he is innocent.  The masses have 
threatened to riot if he was found innocent, but did not riot when it was announced that he was 
dying of a kidney ailment.  Imagine further that violinist has a brother named Jack.  Jack's life 
was saved on several occasions by the violinist, who even donated a kidney to Jack.  Jack 
promised over and over to do anything he could to help his brother if he ever needed help.  The 
violinist's remaining kidney failed, and Jack agreed to be hooked up so that he can help out his 
brother; he even signs a contract saying he will remain hooked up until a donor kidney can be 
found.  Part of the contract is that a large fee is to be paid to Jack up front.  Jack and violinist are 
hooked up.  After the up front fee is deposited into Jack's bank account, he disconnects himself 
and leaves his brother the violinist to die.  The doctors apprehend Jack and hook him back up 
against his will.  To keep the violinist hooked up until a donor kidney is found will incite the 
masses to riot since they want him dead (believing he is an evil mass murder or some such).  In 
other words, there are grave social consequences to letting Jack detach himself.  Let us call this 
case Violinist II.  The first thing that should be noticed is that this case instantiates the form 
captured in Target Schema II.  However, it is not obvious that it is morally permissible for Jack 
to detach himself.  I think it plausible that Violinist and Abortion should be treated differently 
from Violinist II.  So then, should we modify Target Schema II to better capture the similarity 
between Abortion and Violinist while not including as similar Violinist II?  Perhaps we could add 
the following condition. 
(P9) H2 has done nothing to create any obligations towards H1. 
Again, while adding this further condition in an attempt to get the logical form "just right" 
may be tempting to some, it should be resisted.  It is possible that H2 could do something that 
creates obligations towards H1, but it is possible that other obligations could defeat the 
obligations created by H2, which would mean that we would have to make our Target Schema 
longer.  Perhaps still other obligations could defeat the defeated obligations, and further 
obligations could defeat the obligations defeating the defeated obligations, and so on.  This is 
worrisome.  If we cannot have a complete statement of the logical form in principle, on what 
grounds can the charge of inconsistency be made?  It is key to the W&H account of analogical 
argument that a charge of inconsistency can be made (at least in principle) if two arguments 
sharing the same form are treated differently.  What I want to suggest is that it is reasonable to 
treat Violinist II differently from Violinist and Abortion even if, in principle, there is no logical 
form that is always valid. 
Two objections might be raised at this point.  First, it has not been conclusively established 
that there are cases of analogical argument where there is no way to usefully state the complete 
logical form of the target arguments in an analogical meta-argument.  Second, if there are no 
such forms, is it possible to evaluate analogical arguments?  I will take up each objection in turn. 
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Regarding the first objection, I must concede that I have no idea how to conclusively 
establish that the sort of logical forms required for the charge of inconsistency are not always to 
be had.  However, there are kinds of evidence that should give formalists cause for concern.  The 
discussion of Siamese and Violinist II was an attempt to show that it is not obvious that the 
required sort of logical form is always to be had.  But examples from legal reasoning should be 
mentioned as well.  Edward Levi (1948) describes at great length the case law with respect to the 
liability of a seller of  "dangerous articles" to a third party (someone to whom the article was not 
sold).  This is an area of case law where rules were put forward, revised, and rejected in light of 
further cases, and precedents were set and overturned.  Judge Cardozo eventually put forward a 
rule which continues to guide this area of tort law: There is "a duty of vigilance" on the part of 
the seller of dangerous articles, and "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to 
place life and limb in peril, when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger" (Levi 1948, 23).  
Levi makes an important observation about the nature of this sort of rule.  He points out that 
terms such as "negligence" have their meaning clarified by how they are applied, so the 
preceding rule, while it may provide guidance, cannot be taken as the final word on what certain 
cases have in common and how future cases are to be decided.  The reason is that future cases 
may come along which we may want to include under the rule, but those cases may be dissimilar 
from cases presently included, and that would lead to past precedents being overturned and the 
understanding of the rule at issue being changed.  Someone who understands the nature of legal 
reasoning in this way should be concerned with the emphasis W&H place on logical form 
underwriting the charge of inconsistency in analogical argument.  The indeterminate rules and 
principles which Levi acknowledges are part of case law cannot be used as a kind of logical form 
which can license a charge of inconsistency since the rules are understood to be incomplete (and 
a logical form with a ceteris paribus clause, or some other indicator of incompleteness, cannot be 
used to underwrite a charge of inconsistency).  If we agree with Levi's understanding of legal 
reasoning, then we shouldn't be concerned with charging someone with inconsistency if they 
treat two apparently similar cases in different ways.  On the W&H approach, a charge of 
inconsistency would require the statement of a rule or logical form that the target arguments (or 
cases) have in common, but Levi's (1948) survey of parts of the history of legal reasoning 
suggests that such rules are not to be had. 
In more recent work on legal reasoning, Kevin Ashley examines the complexities of trade 
secret law.  He points out (1990, 17) that it is written into law that a complete a complete 
definition of a trade secret is not possible. 
An exact definition of a trade secret is not possible.  Some factors to be considered in 
determining whether given information is one's trade secret are: 
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; 
(2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; 
(3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; 
(4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors 
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information; 
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated 
by others.  Res. (First) of Torts Sec. 757 comment b. 
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So it could not be held against a lawyer arguing in a United States court that her argument 
has not given a complete account of a trade secret. If the objection were raised that she had not 
given a complete account of the similarities between the two cases because she had not 
exhaustively defined the notion of trade secret, she would be entitled to argue that such an 
expectation is unreasonable since the statutes on this matter point out that it is impossible to give 
such a definition.  Without a complete account of what a trade secrete is, it is hard to see how the 
evaluation of an analogical argument on such a topic could turn on being able to make the charge 
of inconsistency based on treating two arguments with a similar form in different ways.  The 
reason is that the full form of the argument that a case at issue really does involve a trade secret 
may not be available. The drafters of the passage quoted above believed that a complete account 
of a trade secret was not to be had.  I take this as evidence in favour of the view that analogical 
arguments cannot always be reconstructed in the manner W&H suggest.  This kind of evidence is 
not conclusive since it may be overturned by future attempts to more precisely capture the notion 
of a trade secret.  Still, I take this evidence to be non-trivial.  The drafters of this legislation had 
much history and case-law to draw on, but that history showed them the dangers of trying to give 
complete account of what cases have in common. 
At this point, I want to return to the second objection mentioned above.  If it is possible to 
"see" or "grasp" that two cases are similar even if there does not appear to be a logical form that 
two cases share, then can we still say that it is possible to evaluate analogical arguments?  The 
point I want to make is that there existence some circumstances under which analogical 
arguments can be critically evaluated.  That legal reasoning frequently involves the critical 
evaluation of cases without stating anything like a logical form that underwrites a charge of 
inconsistency is surely evidence that such evaluation need not turn, even in principle, on the 
ability to make a charge of inconsistency.  Exactly what conditions need to be satisfied for such 
evaluation to take place is a matter that needs its own paper to be explored.  However, there are 
some observations that are worth making at this point. 
First, the logic of analogical arguments appears to be non-monotonic, and their evaluation 
seems to turn on that feature.  A precedent may be cited to establish a point about the case in 
question; that point may be defeated by considerations (including another case) that the parties 
involved agree are to the point; further claims (perhaps another case agreed to be to the point) 
may be cited to defeat the defeating considerations and re-establish the initial conclusion, and so 
on.  This type of flexibility may seem suspicious to some, but it need not be.  Consider the 
following argument. 
(P1)  Jack sees someone who looks exactly like Jill walk into Jill's house. 
(C1)  Therefore, Jill is in her house. 
P1 is not a bad reason for believing C1.  However, if Jack is informed that 
 
(P2)  Jill has an identical twin, 
 
then Jack would be making a highly dubious argument if he argued from P1 and P2 to C1.  Of 
course, if Jack is informed by a close friend of Jill's family that 
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(P3) Jill's twin is on vacation in another country, 
 
then C1 seems to be the appropriate default conclusion.  If Jack finds out that  
 
(P4) The close friend of the family that is the source of information for P3 is a 
compulsive liar, 
 
then, once again, the argument for C1 is questionable. 
That we can add further premises to the initial argument, P1 to C1, which alters the status of 
the conclusion, and that we can repeat this process over and over in no way suggests that we 
cannot critically evaluate arguments of this type.  Moreover, non-monotonicity does not 
undermine the idea that there is a fact of the matter, or a true or false claim to be made, about 
whether Jill is in the house or not.  If analogical arguments are non-monotonic meta-arguments, 
on its own, that in no way establishes that such arguments cannot be evaluated or that there is no 
correct answer to the conclusion attempting to be established. 
Conclusion 
Clearly, more work needs to be done on analogical argument.  How such arguments are best 
evaluated and the circumstances under which they can be evaluated are subjects that need greater 
exploration.  Also, how it is that we can "see" or "grasp" the similarity of arguments even when 
we cannot exhaustively state (perhaps even in principle) the rules or forms that the arguments 
share is something that needs to be explained.  To be sure, we must be bringing all kinds of 
background knowledge to bear in our judgements of similarity, but how do we do that if we are 
not committing ourselves to exceptionless rules or a complete logical form?  This question has 
both descriptive and normative components.  With respect to the descriptive component, there 
have been attempts made by some—Holyoak and Thagard (1995) and Kevin Ashley (1990) 
come to mind—to computationally model analogy in a way that does not make use of the notion 
of logical form that W&H use.  These attempts shed some light on how, as a matter of fact, it 
may be possible to make judgements of similarity without a W&H conception of logical form.  
With respect to the normative component, matters are more difficult.  How ought we to make use 
of background knowledge in coming to judgements of similarity?  Presumably there are 
constraints on what sort of target arguments may be considered similar for the purposes of 
mounting an analogical meta-argument.  What are those constraints?  How are they to be 
expressed if not in terms of an underlying logical form?  I think that descriptive work in 
psychology, cognitive modelling, and artificial intelligence might provide some of the 
descriptive language in terms of which normative constraints may be more precisely articulated.  
Much descriptive and normative work remains to be done in the enterprise of understanding 
similarity judgements and the role they play in making analogical arguments.  Broadly 
conceived, the point of this paper has been to urge that both of these kinds of work should be 
done in a way that does not rely strictly on a notion of logical form that is used to underwrite 
charges of inconsistency. 
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